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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the LLM in Transnational and European 
Commercial Law, Mediation, Arbitration and Energy Law at the International Hellenic 
University.  
The purpose of this research is firstly to provide a presentation of tax havens and their 
characteristics. Only afterwards, it is possible to present the core documents for the 
exchange of financial information, lifting the banking secrecy among different countries. 
Indeed, from the side of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, the Model Competent Authority Agreement and the Common Reporting 
Standard constitute the model law presented so as to promote tax transparency 
worldwide. From the other side, the European Union adopted relevant Directives 
aiming to enhance the capacity of the Member States to assess taxes properly. Until 
recently, all these efforts are not causing the end of tax evasion, but they constitute a 
big step forward.  
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I. Introduction 
The modern era enhances global transactions taking advantage of the different 
legal existing systems. Individuals and entities use the more efficient ways to them so 
as to make profit in case of undeclared revenues. Even if the reason is not always to 
conceal illegal transactions, the opportunity to evade or avoid taxes leads individuals to 
use the benefits offered by different jurisdictions. The existence of tax havens is a 
cause of that and during the last decades, mostly, the number of tax haven jurisdictions 
has multiplied. However, the attributes they may have, like the low taxes and the 
secrecy provided, is a field that government authorities try to undermine. From the 
relevant case law of the previous century and up until recently, different efforts have 
been undertaken so that taxation is increased. 
The main objective of this dissertation is to provide an analysis of the core 
characteristics of tax havens and present the ways governments try to increase the 
public income through the imposition of taxes for which financial information needs to 
be disclosed. The modern approach to achieve this goal is through the automatic 
exchange of information, meaning that tax authorities exchange any relevant 
information directly. At a multilateral level, it was the European Union that first adopted 
legislation so as to strengthen the cooperation among its Member States. During the 
last years, on the other side of the Atlantic, USA adopted the Foreign Account Tax 
Compliance Act of 2009 (henceforth FATCA). Actually, this Act has been criticized for 
promoting a kind of American legal imperialism1 since it concerns the taxation of US 
citizens proceeding to cross-border transactions. However, it paved the way for a 
significant document published by the international Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (henceforth OECD). This new kind of legislation points out 
that powerful governments, mainly, attempt to improve their ability to collect taxes 
given that large capital easily evades taxation. There seems to be a great deal of 
discussion on what these texts are about; therefore, the importance of analyzing the 
main provisions is apparent.  
This dissertation presents a research based on the multilateral legal documents 
existing. In the first place, the core characteristics of tax havens are presented, so that 
the analysis of the legislative documents trying to combat tax avoidance is identified in 
order to understand the proposed solutions. The significance of this dissertation lays 
not only on the presentation of the main mechanisms provided by the European 
                                                 
1
 Bean, B. and Wright, A. (2015) The U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: American Legal 
Imperialism? ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law, 21 (2) 
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Directives and the Common Reporting Standard, but also on the conclusion that almost 
all financial information could be disclosed once their provisions apply worldwide. The 
main issue is that these legislative documents are not binding to any other jurisdiction 
except for the Member States of the EU so that they do not offer a global solution. 
However, both the EU Directive and the CRS constitute a major step forward as they 
try to offer an answer to the problem of tax evasion. The dissertation is divided into 
three chapters which answer eventually the question whether the efforts to combat tax 
avoidance by disclosing and exchanging financial information have been successful.    
The first chapter provides the definition of tax havens, their main characteristics 
and some significant English and European case law allowing the banking secrecy to 
be lifted occasionally. In the first part, the definition of tax havens is briefly given; 
namely, they constitute legal entities offering a competitive taxation system. The 
second part focuses on the main benefits offered by tax havens, namely the low tax 
regime, and most importantly the banking secrecy. The final part points out that, since 
the undisclosed information harms the interests of the state of residence of the 
reportable persons, English and European case law provides further restrictions for the 
banking secrecy. Therefore, there is a number of English and European law cases, 
briefly reviewed in this part, that make the disclosure of financial information mandatory 
for the protection of the general interest, within the relative jurisdictions.   
The second chapter focuses on the model rules published by the OECD for tax 
collection purposes. The chapter is organized into the following structure. Initially, it 
introduces the way that the OECD responded to the countries’ query for a model law 
concerning the exchange of financial information that could be adopted worldwide. 
Therefore, the international organization published two main documents: the Model 
Competent Authority Agreement and the Common Reporting Standard. The first part 
makes an introduction to both documents. The second part makes reference to the 
main provisions of the Model Competent Authority Agreement. Finally, the third part of 
the chapter focuses on the Common Reporting Standard, which is probably the most 
significant document existing in tax cooperation. It emphasizes on the procedure that 
should be followed, not only to guarantee the data protection, but also to be highly 
recognized if most jurisdictions apply its provisions in a uniform manner. Therefore, 
important definitions are stated, like the reporting financial institutions, the reportable 
persons and the reportable accounts. It could be stated that every term is described in 
detail so that no unjust interpretation happens during its application. Although the 
chapter primarily focuses on the presentation of its core provisions, a final part with 
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remarks is included, trying to help finding the answer to the question whether this effort 
means anything to the worldwide exchange of information.  
The third chapter provides insights of the European Directives for the exchange 
of financial information. Taxation falls on the jurisdiction of the Member States and it 
was not an easy matter to create a cooperation scheme among the different countries. 
The first part presents the Directive for the information concerning the taxation of 
savings income. Nowadays there is a proposal from the European side to repeal this 
Directive, because the next ones that came into force are overlapping. The second part 
presents the core characteristics of the Directive on Administrative Cooperation. This 
Directive was amended in 20142, so as to implement the main provisions of the 
Common Reporting Standard, the worldwide standard for the automatic exchange of a 
full spectrum of financial information. Even if it is not an easy way for most countries to 
accept this operation, inside the European Union this is an easy step since the 
cooperation of its Member States has been remarkable during the last years. 
 
II. Tax havens and banking secrecy  
This chapter focuses on tax havens and, more notably, their operations and the 
main attributes, but also includes some English and European case law towards the 
disclosure of financial information. In recent times, there is the need to end the banking 
confidentiality offered by tax havens’ legislation, since the exchange of information is 
considered to be important for tax collection purposes.   
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 Council Directive 2011/16/EU of 15 February 2011 on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation 
and repealing Directive 77/799/EEC, OJ L 64, 11.3.2011: The most favored nation clause mentioned in 
Article 19 was the reason for the amendment; the Member States could not refuse to provide the same 
protection to other Member States, as they were forced by their bilateral agreement with USA, after the 
adoption of the FATCA. Therefore, the CRS model law, including almost the same provisions, was needed 
to be incorporated into EU law. See: Council Directive 2014/107/EU of 9 December 2014 amending 
Directive 2011/16/EU as regards mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation, OJ 
L 359, 16.12.2014, Preamble, para. 7: “The fact that Member States have concluded or are close to 
concluding agreements with the United States of America relating to FATCA means that those Member 
States are providing or will provide for wider cooperation within the meaning of Article 19 of Directive 
2011/16/EU, and are or will be under an obligation to provide such wider cooperation to other Member 
States as well”, and para. 9: “the scope of Article 8 of Directive 2011/16/EU should be extended to include 
the same information covered by the OECD Model Competent Authority Agreement and Common 
Reporting Standard” 
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A. Tax haven; A definition attempt 
 
 
Tax havens are legal entities: either sovereign states or suzerain jurisdictions3. 
Usually, they are very small jurisdictions, e.g. some small islands in the Caribbean, but 
they still have the power to legislate to their own benefit, even if other governments 
consider these laws harmful to their interests. Besides, legality means that specific 
actions are permitted; every jurisdiction has specific rules that govern different 
situations, no matter if they are ethical and similar to those of the other countries or not. 
Although there is no exact definition of the term, the OECD gave the main features 
characterizing tax havens, namely: no or low taxes, lack of effective exchange of 
information, lack of transparency, and no requirement of substantial activities4.  
International literature shows that tax havens are unlikely to be landlocked, 
while they are inclined towards economic openness, having small natural resource 
endowments, and using English as an official language5. Also, better governed 
countries are considered to become famous tax havens. This happens because only 
better-governed countries can credibly engage into not expropriating foreign investors, 
including inter alia the impossibility of increasing taxes in the future, or not 
mismanaging their economy so that foreign investors could not have the expected 
profits. Such a commitment is decisive in order to induce high levels of foreign 
investment6.  
Usually, in tax havens there is very little activity going on, and for this reason 
they are often called as virtual centers or legislative spaces7. Globalization enhanced 
the growth of tax haven systems, while the facilities offered are mainly used for tax 
evasion or, at least, tax avoidance reasons8. They are also used so as to disregard 
laws like the ones for gambling, and, sometimes, the facilities are supposed to be used 
for money laundering9 and terrorist financing. This argument was used as the main 
justification for the efforts to abolish banking secrecy laws.  
                                                 
3
 Palan, R., Murphy, R., and Chavagneux, C. (2010) Tax Havens: How Globalization really works. Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca, NY, USA, p. 3 
4
 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (1998) Harmful Tax Competition: An 
Emerging Global Issue. OECD Publishing, Paris, France, p. 23 
5
 Dharmapala, D. and Hines, J. (2009) Which countries become tax havens? Journal of Public Economics, 
93, p. 1060  
6
 See fn 5, p. 1064 
7
 See fn 3, p. 21 
8
 Tax evasion is illegal, considered to be a criminal offence in most countries, meaning usually that the 
taxpayer is not disclosing all or part of his income or some other times may offset expenses that never 
occurred. On the other hand, tax avoidance is not illegal, since different rules are used so as to pay less 
taxes. See: Prebble, Z. and Prebble, J. (2010) The morality of tax avoidance. Creighton Law Review, 43  
(3), Abstract and p. 700 
9
 Adamoli, S. (2002) The protection of the EU financial system from the exploitation of financial centers 
and offshore jurisdictions by organized crime. In Upperworld and Underworld in Cross-border Crime, Van 
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Transactions through tax havens can also have positive, as commonly 
accepted, consequences. The benefits of going offshore are multiple, such as the 
strong asset protection, the avoidance of currency restrictions, the greater safety in 
banking and investments and the possibility of having an important level of privacy in 
banking offshore10. Sometimes, the motivation to make use of them is that it was 
cheaper to set up branches of banks into locations like the Bahamas while, additionally, 
they shared New York’s time zone11. Those jurisdictions, trying to promote the 
aforementioned advantages, found ways to facilitate the incorporation of companies 
and other entities in their territory, providing the framework for a low cost and 
uncomplicated procedure. That way, they managed to attract clients desiring to avoid 
formalities, and, frequently, the physical presence of the customer is not even a 
prerequisite. Of course, the global context gives the chance to corporations and 
individuals that make use of the tax havens’ services to proceed to a treaty shopping12, 
examining the specific benefits before their choice among the hundreds of bilateral 
treaties existing between their home country and the tax havens.  
The difference with the offshore financial centers lays on the following details: 
an offshore financial center was defined as: “a regime which has chosen as a main or 
important path to development, legislative, financial and business infrastructure which 
is more flexible than orthodox infrastructure and which caters more specifically, and 
often exclusively, to the needs of non-resident investors […] this legislative framework 
includes innovations in trust, banking, fiscal, insurance, financial and company law”13. 
This means that the transactions held through offshore centers are mainly nonresident 
transactions. Offshore centers are usually found into places far away from the most 
developed nations, like in the Caribbean region as mentioned above, but two of the 
most important such centers are located in London and New York. Offshore centers 
consist of a community of experts providing financial services. They are usually 
considered to be the jurisdictions developed to provide a “home”14 for shell companies 
and trusts, banking institutions and insurance companies.  
                                                                                                                                               
Duyne, P. C., Von Lampe, K., and Passas, N. (Eds.), Wolf Legal Publishers (WLP), Nijmegen, The 
Netherlands, pp. 85-113 
10
 Barber, H. (2007) Tax havens today. The benefits and pitfalls of banking and investing offshore. John 
Wiley and Sons Inc., Hoboken, NJ, USA, p.33 
11
 See fn 3, p. 27 
12
 Zucman, G. (2014) Taxing across Borders: Tracking Personal Wealth and Corporate Profits. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, Fall, 28 (4), p. 124 
13
 Belle Antoine, R.M. (2013) Offshore Financial Law, Trusts and related tax issues. 2
nd
 edition, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, UK, p.5 
14
 See fn 3, pp. 24-27 
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Summarizing, a tax haven constitutes a jurisdiction that creates legislation 
facilitating transactions of nonresidents, mainly with a purpose of escaping domestic 
taxation, via the insertion of regulations concerning the banking confidentiality15. 
 
B. The main attributes 
 
To highlight the main features of a tax haven, we need to mention the low or nil 
taxation and the confidentiality provision. To begin with the zero or near zero taxation, 
this low rate is imposed to nonresident companies and savers, while the resident 
population is normally taxed. This practice is usually called ring-fencing, since the 
relevant rules are designed to attract foreign investors16. Economically, the loss of 
money from the side of tax havens could be compensated with the indirect benefits the 
governments achieve to collect. The fact is that all the governments want to have the 
means for achieving the governments’ goals i.e. the financing of public expenditure 
and, additionally, the distribution of income. For this reason, the low level of taxation is 
practically combined with other costs imposed, like the licensing and registration fees, 
that constitute an important contribution to the economy of the, normally, small country. 
Additionally, the majority of these places have developed ties with other larger 
countries that provide to them subsidies in different forms. For instance, the Principality 
of Monaco is considered that it relies on France while Lichtenstein relies on 
Switzerland17.  
The second, but not less important, attribute of a tax haven is the confidentiality 
duty strongly protected, naming it as a secrecy haven, an attribute that helps it 
differentiate from the preferential tax regimes. According to the Report published by the 
OECD18, the main difference between a tax haven and a preferential tax regime is that 
the first one makes no effort to fight harmful tax competition, while a preferential tax 
regime has the tax base and the interest to prevent such practices19. Strict 
confidentiality provisions concern mostly the banking secrecy law, originated in 
Switzerland almost a century ago20, that weakens when countries want to comply with 
                                                 
15
 See fn 3, p. 45 
16
 Schjelderup, G. (2015) Secrecy Jurisdictions. International Tax Public and Finance, p. 4 
17
 See fn 3, p. 32 
18
 See fn 4, pp. 19-35 
19
 Arnold, B. and McIntyre, J. (2002) International Tax Primer. 2
nd
 edition, Kluwer Law International, The 
Hague, The Netherlands, p.141 
20 
In Switzerland, during the end of the 19
th
 century, we meet practices adopted, based mostly on tradition, 
considered to lead to the country’s banking secrecy law. In the same period, larger countries started to 
increase tax rates, leaving Switzerland weaker and unable to compete with other financial centers. Then, 
the idea to apply low taxation provisions and banking secrecy practices in case foreign capital was 
attracted could be considered as a solution for the economic development of the country. Later on, the 
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the disclosure obligation. It also concerns the secret information on the real ownership 
and the purpose of the existing entities. For instance, trusts are usually not even 
registered in a public record, and, subsequently, money laundering regulations are 
difficult to apply21. In addition, untraceable or shell companies created need no proof of 
identity, thus avoiding any responsibility for different activities. The Financial Action 
Task Force Recommendations22 may provide the rules for finding the beneficial 
owners, but those rules are many times neglected by corporate service providers 
located in different countries23.  
Confidentiality constitutes a very important feature of these jurisdictions: it is 
considered to be an attribute of the relationship between the debtor/bank and the 
creditor/customer. Customers usually disclose important personal and professional 
information to the bankers, information that their competitors should not be aware of. 
Even more, there is the idea that confidentiality has an “economic value”24, enhancing 
the attraction of clients in case it is well protected. For instance, Panama has severe 
civil and criminal penalties if financial privacy is not protected25, but almost all tax 
havens make exceptions for criminal matters. 
From the English case law, very early as in 1862, examining the case Foster v 
Bank of London26, it was held that between the banker and the customer there is 
indeed a duty of confidentiality; precisely, the judgement was based on the fact that the 
judge was not aware of any law against this duty. However, this case did not mean the 
                                                                                                                                               
World War I found Switzerland neutral and political stable, applying advantageous practices in the banking 
sector, attributes that finally caused the attraction of foreign capital. Like that, before the adoption of the 
Federal Banking Law, the President of the Federal Council Pilet – Golaz in his message to the Federal 
Assembly referred to the need of reinforcing the security and stability of banks in the time of the global 
economic crises, and to the need for a strict confidentiality in banking matters, since the clients consider it 
of great importance. The adoption of the Federal Banking Law of 1934 led to the development of Swiss 
banking system, where confidentiality is strongly protected. See: Guex, S. (2000) The Origins of the Swiss 
Banking Secrecy Law and Its Repercussions for Swiss Federal Policy. The Business History Review, 74 
(2), pp. 240-242, and Feuille fédérale (1934) No. 6 du 9 février, FF 1934/172, Message du Conseil fédéral 
à l'Assemblée fédérale concernant le projet de loi fédérale sur les banques et les caisses d'épargne, du 2 
février 1934, pp. 173-181
 
21
 See fn 3, pp. 33-35 
22
 “The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an independent inter-governmental body that develops and 
promotes policies to protect the global financial system against money laundering, terrorist financing and 
the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The FATF Recommendations are recognised 
as the global anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CFT) standard.” In the same 
document, there is an identification of the beneficial owners of the legal persons and legal arrangements, 
as widely recognised in legal affairs. See: Financial Action Task Force (FATF) (2012) International 
Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation. Updated 
October 2015, FATF, Paris, France 
23
 See fn 16, p. 3: “Although the international community has laid out rules that require adequate and 
timely information on beneficial ownership through the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), there is 
mounting evidence that corporate service providers, not only in secrecy jurisdictions, but also in countries 
such as Britain and the USA, do not comply with these rules” 
24
 Chaikin, D. (2011) Adapting the Qualifications to the Banker’s Common Law Duty of Confidentiality to 
Fight Transnational Crime. Sydney Law Review, 33 (2), p. 269 
25
 See fn 10, p. 59 
26
 Case Foster v Bank of London, as reported by Stokes, R. (2011) The Genesis of Banking 
Confidentiality. The Journal of Legal History, 32 (3), pp. 285-286 
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protection of the confidentiality duty in the future, due to its unusual facts and due to 
the restrictive interpretation of its judgement. But, some years later, in 1901, another 
case affirmed again the confidentiality duty. The case Great Western Railway v London 
and County Banking Co27 refers to the banker’s duty of confidentiality, arising out of 
implied terms.  
C. Case law against banking secrecy 
 
 
Although banking confidentiality provided by tax havens’ legislation gave a 
flourish to these jurisdictions, in recent years a lot of efforts are apparent so as to 
discourage offshore transactions. From the case law to important legal instruments, 
mainly the most developed nations try to receive information concerning financial 
assets and property items belonging to their citizens. Offshore transactions make tax 
collection a difficult task for the competent authorities. Subsequently, some decades 
ago, the first signs of revealing important financial information are apparent from the 
case law.  
As such, in 1924 a famous dispute was brought in front of the English Court of 
Appeal, very frequently cited afterwards in banking law. It is about the case of Tournier 
v National Provincial and Union Bank of England. The decision was in favor of the 
financial privacy, stating that there was an “implied” contractual term28 imposing the 
obligation to the bank of not disclosing information of its clients to third persons. It was 
held that “I come to the conclusion that one of the implied terms of the contract is that 
the bank enter into a qualified obligation with their customer to abstain from disclosing 
information as to his affairs without his consent. I am confirmed in this conclusion by 
the admission of counsel for the bank that they do, in fact, consider themselves under a 
legal obligation to maintain secrecy”29. This duty is many times protected by statutory 
law with stringent provisions of criminal nature, and, in some jurisdictions, a statutory 
change would be needed for lifting the secrecy provided30. However, the protection of 
                                                 
27
 Case Great Western Railway v London and County Banking Co, as reported by Young, M.A. (2013) 
Banking Secrecy and Offshore Financial Centres: Money laundering and offshore banking. Routledge, 
Abingdon, UK, p. 112 
28
 See fn 24, p. 265 
29
 Case Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England, UK Court of Appeal (1924) 1 K.B. 461, 
p. 484 
30
 For instance, see the case of Switzerland, Loi fédérale sur les banques et les caisses d’épargne (Loi sur 
les banques, LB) 1 du 8 novembre 1934 (Etat le 1er juillet 2015), art. 47: “1. Est puni d’une peine privative 
de liberté de trois ans au plus ou d’une peine pécuniaire celui qui, intentionnellement: a. en sa qualité 
d’organe, d’employé, de mandataire ou de liquidateur d’une banque, ou encore d’organe ou d’employé 
d’une société d’audit, révèle un secret à lui confié ou dont il a eu connaissance en raison de sa charge ou 
de son emploi; b. incite autrui à violer le secret professionnel; c. révèle un secret qui lui a été confié au 
sens de la let. a ou exploite ce secret à son profit ou au profit d’un tiers. 1bis Est puni d’une peine privative 
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banking secrecy is not unconditional. From the aforementioned case, four fundamental 
qualifications were provided to its limitation. The disclosure of confidential information 
can be accepted a) under the compulsion of law, or b) when there is a duty to the 
public, or c) for the interest of the bank or d) after the customer’s consent31. 
The four aforementioned categories were developed by English case law. The 
compulsion of law qualification frequently involves regulatory or investigatory 
authorities that access confidential information held by a bank32. Looking into the case 
Norwich Pharmacal Co v Customs and Excise Commissioners33, the House of Lords 
held that the bank may be ordered to disclose to a third party information so that he is 
able to commence proceedings against the bank’s client. The second qualification was 
stated in Pharaon v Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA34. Precisely, it was 
held that the duty of confidentiality to a client of a bank can be overridden where fraud 
is alleged and, subsequently, information disclosure is required to support private 
litigation. Concerning the interest of the bank, in the case Sunderland v Barclays 
Bank35, it was stated that it was an interest of the bank to disclose information about a 
client that has drawn several cheques in respect of debts coming from gambling, when 
it wanted to dishonor a cheque. The last qualification concerns the breach of 
confidentiality in case of an express or implied consent of the customer. In Turner v 
Royal Bank of Scotland plc36 was concluded that the banking practice did not justify the 
use of information about the client’s creditworthiness, although the bank supposed that 
it had an implied consent on that. But, another case affirmed the implied consent of the 
bank’s client. The case Lee Gleeson Pty v Sterling Estates Pty Ltd37 found that the 
bank was impliedly authorized to advise the third party, the builder, of the changed 
instructions.  
                                                                                                                                               
de liberté de cinq ans au plus ou d’une peine pécuniaire celui qui obtient pour lui-même ou pour un tiers 
un avantage pécuniaire en agissant selon l’al. 1, let. a ou c” 
31
 See fn 29, p. 473 
32
 Ellinger, E.P., Lomnicka, E. and Hare, C.V.M. (2011) Ellinger's Modern Banking Law. 5th edition, Oxford 
University Press, NY, USA, p.180 
33
 Case Norwich Pharmacal Co v Customs and Excise Commissioners, House of Lords (1974) AC 133: 
this case involves the owner and exclusive licensee of a patent, when his patent was infringed by unknown 
importers into the United Kingdom. Norwich Pharmacal Co started litigation against the Excise 
Commissioners that forced the disclosure of information so that the importer of the chemical could be 
identified in order to reach the one who infringed the patent. The House of Lords held that when an 
innocent third party has information relating to another party's unlawful conduct, a court could order the 
assisting of the person suffering damage by disclosing the needed information.  
34
 Case Pharaon v Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA, as reported by Ellinger, E.P., 
Lomnicka, E. and Hare, C.V.M. (2011) Ellinger's Modern Banking Law, p. 181 
35
 Case Sunderland v Barclays Bank, as reported by Ellinger, E.P., Lomnicka, E. and Hare, C.V.M. (2011) 
Ellinger's Modern Banking Law, pp.191-192 
36
 Case Turner v Royal Bank of Scotland plc, as reported by Ellinger, E.P., Lomnicka, E. and Hare, C.V.M. 
(2011) Ellinger's Modern Banking Law, pp.195-197 
37
 Case Lee Gleeson Pty v Sterling Estates Pty Ltd, as reported by O'Donovan, J. (2005) Lender liability. 
Sweet & Maxwell, London, UK, p. 162 
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In recent times, along the same line, an important non judicial case revealing 
the future efforts by governments to end tax evasion is the one involving the Union 
Bank of Switzerland AG (UBS), a bank helping clients coming from USA to conceal 
their offshore accounts from their state of residence. The conclusion of a bilateral treaty 
between the two countries was the key for the dispute settlement, considered to be a 
“major step” to the weakening of banking secrecy’s history38.  
From the EU perspective, a case brought in front of the Court of Justice during 
the last decade referred to Luxembourg law on this matter. Under Luxembourg law, 
professional secrecy is governed by the Luxembourg Criminal Code. In the case 
Criminal proceedings against Paul der Weduwe39 it is provided that according to the 
country’s statutory law a) Directors, members of the governing and supervisory boards, 
managers, employees and other persons employed by the credit institutions and other 
professions of the financial sector mentioned […] shall be required to maintain secrecy 
in regard to information entrusted to them in the course of their professional business. 
Disclosure of such information is an offence punishable under […] the Criminal Code, 
and b) The duty to maintain secrecy shall cease when disclosure of information is 
authorized or required by or pursuant to a legislative provision even if it predates the 
enactment hereof. The Court stated that the questions submitted were inadmissible.  
The change of direction became apparent some years later, in Coty Germany 
GmbH v Stadtsparkasse Magdeburg40. Coty Germany GmbH is a producer and 
distributor of perfumes, holding also an exclusive license for a specific perfumery. The 
dispute arose when the company purchased through the internet a bottle of the 
perfume for which it had the license, finding out that it was a counterfeit product. Then, 
it requested for the name of the holder of the account that he had paid for the perfume.  
When the company started a court litigation, the Bundesgerichtshof, namely the 
Federal Court of Justice, decided to stay the proceedings and to ask for a preliminary 
ruling before the Court of Justice. Then, it was held that the provision concerning the 
protection of intellectual property rights “must be interpreted as precluding a national 
provision […] which allows, in an unlimited and unconditional manner, a banking 
institution to invoke banking secrecy in order to refuse to provide […] information 
concerning the name and address of an account holder”.  
                                                 
38
 Szarmach, L. (2010) Piercing the Veil of Bank Secrecy? Assessing the United States’ Settlement in the 
UBS Case. Cornell International Law Journal, 43 (2) 
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Nowadays, it is apparent that the global efforts towards the lifting of banking 
secrecy may mean the weakening of the role that tax havens play today. Following the 
case law towards this direction, the OECD has published a model law, while USA 
adopted the FATCA; in the same time, the EU is making its own efforts for the 
exchange of information. At the bilateral level, different existing treaties include 
provisions so as to protect the interests of the country of residence that tries to 
minimize the flow of capitals to low taxation territories. 
 
 
III. The OECD model rules for the exchange of financial 
information  
The leaders of the economically most developed countries of the world 
requested for a model law to provide solutions for a worldwide cooperation regarding 
tax matters. Thus, the OECD provided the model rules that made a significant progress 
towards the lifting of banking secrecy in order to ensure tax compliance when cross-
border transactions take place.  
 
A. Introduction  
 
The OECD supports the fight against tax evasion on the global level longtime 
ago. However, according to international literature, it was founded that all previous 
efforts have led only to a relocation of bank deposits between tax havens41. Havens 
unwilling to comply with new global standards manage to attract new clients, while the 
most compliant ones have lost some of them. The conclusion was that the total amount 
of wealth managed offshore was left unchanged.  
Now, the Organization proceeded to a different effort; it prepared a model law, 
consisting of the Model Competent Authority Agreement and the Common Reporting 
Standard. The Model Competent Authority Agreement42 has provisions so as to ensure 
the appropriate flows of information, containing clauses relevant to the compliance and 
enforcement in the contracting states. It also contains provisions concerning the type of 
information that should be exchanged and the timing and method for the automatic 
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exchange. The Model Competent Authority Agreement was provided because a 
separate agreement between the competent authorities is needed, if a bilateral or a 
multilateral treaty43 among the interested jurisdictions already exists44.  The Multilateral 
Competent Authority Agreement is signed today by 79 jurisdictions45, while most of the 
signatory states are pledged to exchange this kind of information in 2017.  
The Common Reporting Standard has the rules concerning the reporting of 
financial institutions to their home jurisdiction. This model law provides the so called 
due diligence procedures that should be followed in order to protect the quality of the 
required information46. It is not a treaty and, thus, it should be transposed into domestic 
law or into the European legislation47 (indeed, in the case of the European Union, this 
has already happened through the adoption of the Directive 2014/107/EU). The 
Common Reporting Standard is very similar to the FATCA having only small 
differences mainly because of its multilateral character, while FATCA is applied through 
bilateral conventions between USA and other countries48.  
Concluding, it is worth mentioning that a basic feature of both texts is that data 
secrecy is protected in detailed rules. Towards this way, the receiving jurisdiction 
adopts the legal framework in order to ensure a high level of protection of the data 
disclosed, while the OECD’s Guide on confidentiality could also be found as an 
important document serving the same purpose49. 
 
B. The Model Competent Authority Agreement  
 
The Model Competent Authority Agreement constitutes the text furnishing the 
detailed rules for the automatic exchange of information between jurisdictions. Such an 
agreement may be either bilateral, based50 or not on reciprocity51, or even it can have a 
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 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2015) The CRS Implementation 
Handbook. OECD Publishing, Paris, France, p. 24 
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multilateral character52. For this reason, the OECD published three different models, 
similar in the general lines, but having differences at the relevant clauses. It depends 
on the will and the needs of the different governments that lead them to conclude one 
or more of these Model Agreements.  
The Model Agreement consists of a preamble and seven sections. The 
preamble is serving two purposes: it is fulfilling the purpose to mention the general 
objectives and the main ambition, namely the collaboration of the signatory jurisdictions 
in tax matters, and it adduces that the signatory jurisdictions seek to improve 
international tax compliance assisting each other through the automatic exchange of 
information. Still, this procedure has to follow the rules of confidentiality, provided that 
the information exchanged is used only for the purposes agreed upon. 
The different sections of the Model Agreement refer to the practical matters. 
Precisely, it is delineated that a reportable account constitutes the financial account 
maintained by a reporting institution, held by a reportable person or by a passive 
enterprise, for which the controlling persons are reportable persons53, as defined in the 
Common Reporting Standard. In this case, the information exchanged includes mainly 
the name and the tax identification number of the country of residence of the reportable 
persons together with the account balances54. This information should be automatically 
exchanged between the competent authorities55. In regard to the definition of the 
reporting financial institutions, it is mentioned, negatively, that these institutions are not 
the non-reporting financial institutions56, again as defined in the Common Reporting 
Standard. 
C. The Common Reporting Standard (CRS) 
 
i. An overview of the core provisions 
 
 
The Common Reporting Standard provides the detailed procedure in case a 
government asks for information from its financial institutions, always complying with 
the due diligence requirements57. Those requirements are further elaborated, while 
analytical provisions are stated concerning the reportable information and the targeted 
                                                                                                                                               
nonreciprocal agreement could largely be based on the Model Competent Authority Agreement, some 
changes would be needed in order to reflect its nonreciprocal nature”, p. 223  
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institutions. Finally, the rules and the administrative procedures are available, so as to 
ensure the effective implementation of its provisions.  
Regarding the basic provisions of the Common Reporting Standard, it is worthy 
to analyze the due diligence procedures provided: the financial institutions have to 
report solely the information concerning the residents of the participating jurisdictions58. 
The due diligence procedures concern mainly an estimation of the time the account 
was created; also, there is an estimation whether the account holder is an individual or 
an entity. Still, they may differentiate, depending on the value of the accounts 
examined, taking always care of the exceptions for which this information should not be 
reportable, as it happens when there are cash value insurance contracts.  
Not all jurisdictions have the possibility to benefit from the automatic exchange 
of information regime59. The Common Reporting Standard applies only to those 
jurisdictions that have already created the legal basis to this. To introduce the most 
popular way, this means that a jurisdiction should initially become a party of a 
multilateral convention in tax matters, and then sign a bilateral or multilateral competent 
authority Agreement containing the clauses of the Common Reporting Standard. 
Afterwards, the exchange of information happens only bilaterally. In recent times, many 
jurisdictions, even Switzerland and Monaco that are famous tax haven jurisdictions, 
have created the appropriate legal framework. Thenceforth, the financial institutions 
that are resident in participating jurisdictions have the responsibility to collect the 
appropriate information, as far as the individuals and entities resident of another 
participating jurisdiction are concerned. As a consequence, only the jurisdictions that 
comply with these requirements would send and receive financial information 
bilaterally.  
It is certain that only entities can be reporting financial institutions. Such entities 
are considered to have the broad definition of the term, meaning that they may be legal 
persons or legal arrangements, like partnerships and trusts, the last ones mainly in 
case of investment entities60. Thence, they are, usually, custodial institutions, like 
custodial banks and brokers, depository institutions, like savings and commercial 
banks, investment entities and specified insurance companies, resident in a 
participating jurisdiction. In case their branches are located in non-participating 
jurisdictions, financial institutions do not collect this information for the branches. Under 
the Common Reporting Standard, the residence of an entity means the place where it 
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is resident for tax purposes; if this is not the case because it is treated as fiscally 
transparent, then it is considered to be resident in the place it is incorporated or has its 
management or is subject to financial supervision. If the entity is a trust, it is considered 
to be resident of the jurisdiction in which one or more trustees are resident, but only in 
case the trust is not already considered being resident of another participating 
jurisdiction61. Finally, there is the provision that institutions of a public nature or the 
ones considered having low risk of being used for tax evasion, like governmental 
entities, international organizations, central banks and pension funds, constitute entities 
excluded from the obligation to report, according to the Standard62.  
On the subject of the reportable persons, information should be disclosed about 
the account holders, individuals or entities, even from the trusts, residents of the 
participating jurisdictions, and the estates of a decedent that was previously resident in 
a participating jurisdiction63. It is important to note that the reportable entities concerned 
are not financial institutions64. Additionally, various entities are not treated as reportable 
persons, e.g. corporations the stock of which is traded on securities markets, 
governmental entities, international organizations and central banks65. Ultimately, in 
case the reportable entities are passive non-financial entities66, then the financial 
institutions should identify the controlling persons, and if they are reportable persons, 
then the relevant information should be reported accordingly67.  
In the case of reportable passive non-financial entities, the controlling persons 
are defined as the beneficial owners described in the Financial Action Task Force 
Recommendations68. If the reportable entity is a legal person, the controlling persons 
are the natural persons that exercise control over the entity; in general terms, they are 
the persons with a controlling ownership interest. The control maybe exercised through 
direct or indirect ownership or shareholding of one or more intermediate entities. On 
the occasion that the reportable entity is a partnership, then the controlling persons are 
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considered to be the natural persons that exercise control through direct or indirect 
ownership of the capital or having profits of the partnership, voting rights or exercise 
control over the management. Finally, if the reportable entity is a trust, then the 
controlling person is every person involved in it, like the settlor, the trustee, the 
protector, the beneficiary69 and every natural person exercising effective control over 
the trust. When the settlor, the trustee, the protector and the beneficiary are entities, 
then the reporting institutions should identify the controlling persons of the entities70.  
The Common Reporting Standard provides, finally, the details for the kind of 
information that should be reported71. As such, the information disclosed concerns all 
types of investment income, mainly interest and dividends but also the account 
balances and sales proceeds from financial assets. This information definitely includes 
inter alia the details of the account holder like the name and the tax identification 
number, the account number, the account balance and the gross amount of income 
from dividends and interests. There are some exceptions, like the retirement and 
pension accounts and the term life insurance accounts. 
ii. The application of CRS; a new world regime? 
 
Even from the first sight, it can be noted that the documents published by the 
OECD do not create a new legal tax order worldwide. This happens not only because a 
certain number of countries have agreed to adopt those documents, but also because 
the current versions exclude many kinds of reportable information.  
Developed countries seem to have the main concern to impose and apply the 
model law in order to obtain financial information for their own residents. However, if 
the real need is a new existing order all around the world, it is very important that the 
developing countries become participating jurisdictions, as well. If not, reportable 
persons could evade the automatic exchange of information if they choose to have 
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financial transactions in a non-participating jurisdiction, or if they become residents of a 
non-participating jurisdiction. For this reason, it is proposed that incentives should be 
given to governments, usually non-members of the OECD, in order to participate in this 
exchange of information scheme72. Besides, in reality, they need this kind of 
information at the most73. 
Therefore, attention should be given primarily to the capacity building and to the 
non-reciprocity condition, if necessary, so that weaker countries become only recipients 
of information74. Moreover, some other issues need to be fixed accordingly, allowing 
the creation of proportional confidentiality requirements and the introduction of 
guarantees for the collection of information coming from bigger countries. This means 
that the OECD countries should take care of the developing countries’ needs75. 
Strategies like the ones previously mentioned would probably motivate the developing 
countries in becoming participating jurisdictions, when the benefits for them would be 
substantial from the very beginning.  
The Common Reporting Standard has numerous loopholes that would be 
important to address in the future76. Mainly, the financial exchange of information 
comprises a lot of exceptions that keep out multiple ways for the preservation of 
banking secrecy. For instance, a number of reporting institutions are exempted from 
the obligation to disclose financial information, or, concerning the ratione materiae of 
the model rules, some wealth-related information is omitted from its clauses, as it 
happens with the information on interest in real estate77.  
Ultimately, incentives should be given to the developing countries so that they 
become participating jurisdictions of the new tax order, and, secondly, many loopholes 
of the existing documents need to be fixed so that the elites do not find ways to 
perpetuate harmful tax practices. The OECD may have published the Model 
Competent Authority Agreement and the Common Reporting Standard, but all this 
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effort does not lead to the end of the tax havens era, and, even if relevant legal 
documents are adopted nowadays, there is a long way to go until the automatic 
exchange of information among all the countries around the world. 
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IV. The EU Directives for the exchange of financial 
information  
Inside the European Union, the Member States shall disclose information 
between each other about savings and other assets held by European citizens. Tax 
transparency is the cornerstone, although taxation falls within the competence of the 
Member States, as part of their sovereignty. 
A. The Savings Directive and the Directive on Administrative 
Cooperation, as recently amended 
i. The Savings Directive 
A very important step for the EU to lift banking secrecy had been the adoption 
of the Directive on taxation of savings income. Its main aim was to enable savings 
income made in one Member State to be made subject to taxation if the owner is an 
individual of another Member State78. This piece of legislation was considered to be a 
milestone for the tax cooperation of the Member States and was long discussed and 
analyzed79. This Directive was not proposed and adopted at once. The abolishment of 
capital exchange controls was fundamental for the establishment of the internal market 
but it led to the creation of a large tax haven inside the EU territory, since corporations 
and individuals tried to benefit from the differentiation of existing tax regimes. Although 
a common tax rate on savings income could be considered to be a valuable solution, 
this provision was not easily accepted80.  
The present Directive concerns only the interest payments, as defined in Article 
6. The main provision is that a paying agency of one Member State reports a minimum 
amount of information to the competent authority of its Member State concerning the 
interest payments benefited by individuals taxed in a different Member State81. 
Unfortunately, legal persons are excluded from the scope of the Directive. The 
“beneficial owner is any individual who receives an interest payment, or any individual 
for whom the interest payment is secured for his own benefit”82. The information 
disposed concerns the personal details of the beneficial owner, including inter alia his 
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identity, his residence and his account number83. The Directive provides the automatic 
way for the exchange of information. Precisely, the competent authority of the Member 
State of the paying agency has the obligation to exchange any relevant information to 
the competent authority of the Member State of the beneficial owner84. This happens 
automatically, at least once a year, for all interest payments made during this period85.   
The Savings Directive has been criticized for containing a number of loopholes 
needed to be fixed. Apart from the legal persons that are not included in its personal 
scope, it has been proposed that the taxation of interest at source is vital for fulfilling its 
main objective. In a different scenario, jurisdictions, like Gibraltar, could attract 
investments since their legislation exempts most types of interest86. In addition, Austria, 
Belgium and Luxembourg are permitted to maintain a withholding tax system instead of 
providing information87. 
Later on, it was amended, primarily because some financial instruments were 
not formerly covered, including the ones equivalent to interest-bearing securities and 
certain indirect means of holding interest-bearing securities88. Significant definitions are 
posed, having a clarification of the definition of interest payment, in order to ensure that 
indirect investments are taken into consideration when calculating the percentage of 
the assets invested in these instruments89. Moreover, the present document includes 
various personal details reported, including inter alia the tax identification number90.  
Nowadays, there is a proposal to repeal the Savings Directive since it is mentioned that 
the prospective Directive 2014/107/EU “will take precedence” over the revised Savings 
Directive, and, like that, a significant overlap will exist, albeit, in some cases, the 
Directive of 2003 could also apply. However, “the benefit to be gained from keeping the 
two legal instruments operating in parallel would be minimal”. For this reason, to make 
sure that there is only one standard for the automatic exchange of information and in 
order to prevent situations where both Directives are applied in parallel, it is proposed 
that the Savings Directive should be repealed91. 
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ii. The Directive on Administrative Cooperation 
The European Union makes efforts to confront tax avoidance and tax evasion in 
different ways. A Directive was adopted in 197792 aiming to strengthen the 
collaboration between the 9 Member States. Particularly, under the Directive on Mutual 
Assistance, the competent authorities, usually the Ministries of Finance or their 
authorized representatives93, should exchange any information needed to realize the 
correct assessment of taxes on income and on capital94, “irrespective of the manner in 
which they are levied”95. The Directive provides three different ways for the exchange 
of information, namely the exchange on request, the spontaneous exchange and the 
automatic exchange96.  
An important case law came after the application of this Directive. Precisely, a 
case brought before the Court of Justice concerned the request for a preliminary ruling 
to clarify whether the exchange of information procedure protects specific rights of 
taxpayers or not. In this case, Jiří Sabou, a Czech professional footballer, challenged 
the notice of the Czech tax authority, which has carried out an inspection involving 
requests from different Member States. The judgement of the Court mentions that 
European Union law, and mainly the Directive on Mutual Assistance, must be 
interpreted as not conferring on a taxpayer the right to be informed of a request for 
assistance or the right to take part in formulating the request addressed to other 
Member States, or the right to take part in examinations of witnesses organized by 
other Member States97.  
The Directive on Administrative Cooperation of 201198 repeals the Directive on 
Mutual Assistance. Particularly, it expands the scope of cooperation in this field, since 
the new Directive concerns all taxes99, direct and indirect, not covered yet by other 
European legal texts. The cooperation of Member States, even by electronic means, 
will enable them to collect taxes properly100. Information concerning all taxes of any 
kind levied by, or on behalf of, a Member State or its subdivisions, including local 
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authorities, shall be subject to exchange101. However, the value added tax, customs 
duties and excise duties are covered by different European legislation and thus exempt 
from the scope of this Directive, as it happens with the mandatory social security 
contributions102.   
Definitely, it gives the minimum rules and enables Member States to proceed to 
a wider cooperation, if possible103. Given that it is not an easy matter for national 
authorities to assess taxes properly due to the internationalization of financial 
instruments, the internal market functioning is showing its negative consequences. The 
solution proposed has to do with the exchange of information between the Member 
States, developing schemes and providing common rules broadly accepted. An 
important section of relates to the gathering of information from a Member State when 
requested, even if it is not needed for its own tax purposes104. For different scenarios, 
there are three different ways to disseminate this information. Like previously, there is 
an exchange of information upon request, the spontaneous and the automatic 
exchange.  
The exchange of information on request happens when a requesting authority 
receives the information mentioned in Article 1(1), if the competent authority of another 
Member State has it in its possession or if it has obtained it after administrative 
enquiries105. The requesting authority can also ask for a specific administrative enquiry 
mentioning the justification for that106. In both cases, the requested authority should 
proceed to the necessary actions as if it was to the benefit of its own Member State107, 
inside the time limits mentioned carefully for each single case108. 
The spontaneous exchange happens if: a) the competent authority of one 
Member State has grounds for supposing a possible loss of tax for another Member 
State, or b) when a person has a reduction or an exemption from taxes in one Member 
State that would increase his liability in another Member State, or c) when a saving in 
tax could happen in case two persons from different Member States conduct business 
dealings, or d) when the competent authority on one Member state has grounds for 
supposing that groups of enterprises obtain a saving of tax because of artificial 
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transfers of profits, or e) when information forwarded to one Member State from a 
second one permitted information to be obtained that may be helpful in assessing 
liability to tax in the second Member State. Possibly, the competent authorities can 
disseminate information between each other when they are aware of and in case it 
could be useful to the others109.  
Finally, it is provided that the competent authority of one Member State shall 
automatically inform the competent authority of another Member State for the incomes 
coming from employment, for the director’s fees, the life insurance products not 
covered by other European legal texts, the pensions and the ownership of an income 
coming from immovable property110.  
The Directive of 2011 was amended in 2014111 since the EU wanted to respond 
to the new challenges coming along, in the period when bilateral treaties between the 
Member States and USA are concluded after the adoption of the FATCA, and when the 
OECD presented the Common Reporting Standard. Thus, it is necessary for the EU to 
have its own legislation, not only to fight against tax evasion in case cross-border 
transactions take place, but also to confer legal certainty to its Member States and its 
individuals112. The legal roots of this amendment lays on the most favored nation 
clause mentioned in the Directive of 2011, forcing a Member State not to refuse to 
provide a wider cooperation to other Member States, if it has already developed a 
wider cooperation with a third country113.  
Now, the exchange of information shall happen at least once a year114. The 
competent authority of each Member State, from the beginning of 2016, should 
additionally inform the other competent authority of the identification of the reportable 
persons, including the tax identification number and the account number that they 
have, and, if the account holder is an entity and one or more controlling persons are 
reportable persons, then the same information should be disclosed, this time for the 
controlling reportable persons115. The term reportable person means Member States 
persons, individuals or the estates of a decedent that were resident in any Member 
State, and entities, resident in any Member State, excluding mainly corporations the 
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stock of which is traded on established securities markets, governmental entities, 
central banks and international organizations116.  
Concerning entities, partnerships, limited liability partnerships and similar legal 
arrangements that have no residence for tax purposes, they are considered to be 
resident in the country where the effective management takes place. Finally, in case of 
passive non-financial institutions, it is recognized that the controlling persons should be 
found so as to conclude if they are reportable persons or not117. The controlling 
persons are the natural persons that exercise control over the entity. In case of a trust, 
it means the settlor, the trustee, the protector, the beneficiary and any other natural 
person that exercises ultimate effective control. If there is a legal arrangement other 
than a trust, the controlling persons are the ones having similar positions. It is important 
that the European Directive keeps the interpretation of the term from the Financial 
Action Task Force Recommendations118.    
The Directive, also, mentions the important details in order to define the 
reporting financial institutions. For this reason, the Member States should provide a list 
with the non-reporting financial institutions and the excluded accounts to the 
Commission, which will be published as necessary119. Both the reporting and the non-
reporting financial institutions are defined in the first annex of the Directive of 2014. If 
the financial institutions are mainly custodial institutions, depository institutions, 
investment entities and specified insurance companies, the reporting ones are defined 
negatively, as the financial institutions that are not non-reporting financial institutions. 
Moreover, they should be resident in a Member State or the branches of non-reporting 
institutions should be resident in a Member State. Precisely, the non-reporting financial 
Institutions are inter alia governmental entities, international organizations and central 
banks, custodial institutions, depository institutions, retirement and pension funds, and 
other entities that present a low risk of being used for tax evasion120.  
The Directive gives the essential definitions for the correct application of its 
provisions. In detail, lifting the banking secrecy, the reportable account is defined as 
the one maintained by a Member’s State reporting financial institution, held by 
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reportable persons or by passive non-financial institutions when their controlling 
persons are reportable persons.  
It is also provided that the competent authorities of the Member States can 
inform the others in case they are not willing to receive any kind of relevant information. 
Moreover, there is the provision to disseminate this information from third countries and 
to third countries, as well. Precisely, a competent authority of one Member State 
receiving information from a third country may, if it is permitted by their bilateral or 
multilateral agreement, provide this information to the competent authorities of other 
Member States, but only if they have an interest to that. Also, the competent authorities 
may communicate information obtained to a third country, but only if the competent 
authority of the Member State from which the information originates has consented to 
this, and, cumulatively, the third country agrees to gather evidence for the “irregular or 
illegal nature of transactions which appear to contravene or constitute an abuse of tax 
legislation”121. 
Concluding the research, the added value of the amendment of the Directive, 
except for the important definitions mentioned in its first Annex, is that the Member 
States are required to adopt and publish the laws and regulations needed so as to 
comply with the provisions of the Directive by the end of 2015. The Member States are 
urged to apply the measures from the beginning of the following year, with the 
exception of Austria, that should comply with it a year later122. 
B. The CRS in the light of the Directive on Administrative Cooperation  
For the EU, it is not needed to adopt a Model Competent Authority Agreement, 
since the clauses of its Directives are incorporated into national law. The European 
Directives are binding to all Member States, while the documents published by the 
OECD need to be signed and applied by the interested jurisdictions worldwide.  
Generally, it can be noted that the Directive on Administrative Cooperation was 
amended so as to be in parallel with the Common Reporting Standard. Both the 
Directive on Administrative Cooperation and the Common Reporting Standard refer to 
the data protection safeguards and to the due diligence procedures that should be 
followed. 
In the European side, there is the provision that the exchange of information 
can happen in three different ways: upon request, automatically and spontaneously, for 
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different kinds of financial information. However, the Common Reporting Standard 
provides only the automatic way for the exchange of financial information. This 
happens because in the European Union there is a strong cooperation in many fields 
and, therefore, the spontaneous or upon request exchange of information happens in 
supplementary cases, enhancing the general cooperation among the Member States. 
Moreover, the amendment that the Directive 2014/107/EU provided, added significant 
information that should be disposed automatically. For instance, it provides that the 
personal details, including the tax identification number, the account number and the 
account balance of the reportable persons should be provided to the other countries.  
Thereupon, it can be considered that the European Union provided the 
exchange of financial information before the publication of the relevant documents by 
the OECD. However, the Common Reporting Standard was providing the automatic 
exchange for a full spectrum of financial information that was not mentioned previously 
in the European legislation. For this reason, the Directive 2014/107/EU was adopted so 
as to incorporate the Common Reporting Standard into European law, including the 
same details for the information that should be disclosed, and giving the definitions and 
the due diligence procedures for the effective implementation of the automatic 
exchange of information. 
Inside the EU, it is possible that banking secrecy is finally lifted, and this 
operation brings the desired benefits. There is an integrated mechanism that forces 
Member States to engage in all the operations agreed upon. European law is binding to 
Member States, given that they have to transfer the provisions of the Directives into 
national legislation. Therefore, it can be considered that the relevant financial 
information will be indeed disclosed in the future. This is an operation that can work 
only through the total commitment of governments, and it is challenging to see the 
results that will appear after the application of these legal instruments. Possible 
tensions between the Member States are softly avoided, when there is no 
differentiation with countries that have been characterized in the past as famous tax 
havens. 
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V. Conclusions 
This paper, although just skimming the surface of the important matters relating 
to tax havens, attempted to present the core issues of the existing legal texts 
concerning the exchange of financial information among different countries worldwide. 
In order to better understand the mechanisms elaborated by different international 
organizations, the first chapter briefly analyses the main characteristics of tax havens. 
The secrecy provision, an attribute that enhances global transactions, has a negative 
consequence to the governments because they seem to be unable of collecting taxes 
properly. For this reason, from the case law to the national and international law, 
governments endeavor to receive the financial information needed. It cannot be denied 
that this operation could be successful only through the multilateral cooperation. 
Regrettably, there is no existing mechanism to deal with banking secrecy 
accurately. The second and third chapter of this essay point out that a major effort to 
this end was the model law presented by the OECD. The OECD presented the 
Common Reporting Standard, similar to the legal Act adopted by USA, and afterwards 
implemented by the European Union. Certainly, there are detailed provisions for the 
efficient exchange of the most important financial information, concerning the income 
and assets held by individuals and companies, even by offshore companies. For this 
reason, some of the most crucial definitions are posed by the legislators, also 
presented in this dissertation. Throughout the introduction of the main mechanisms 
provided so that countries exchange financial information concerning their residents, it 
is deduced that this operation is not reaching the end of the tax havens epoch.     
Observing the current situation, the majority of governments disregard the 
adoption of relevant legislation, considering it to be harmful for their interests. 
Consequently, any effort to exchange financial information depends on the real 
counties’ will. The model rules published by the OECD are not widely recognized and 
adopted. It is expected that the European Union solely could adopt relevant legislation, 
mainly because the cooperation of its Member States is outstanding. Concerning the 
rest of the countries, this operation could be successful only sporadically, when legal 
provisions to this end were posed in the different bilateral agreements. Further 
research would be needed in the future, primarily because the relevant provisions are 
not applied yet, while it is essential to evaluate the results and the relevant case law 
that may arise; at present, only a theoretical analysis can be made, since there is no 
practical application of the aforementioned documents. Secondly, it is necessary to 
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record the prospective signatory jurisdictions in order to observe the dynamic of the 
operation. 
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